Bribery, Lobbying, and Burn
Early in this book we describe inefficiency in governance systems being released as wasted money in the same way inefficiency in mechanical systems is released as heat. Some interesting designs for mechanical systems find ways to capture and use this waste, such as bitcoin mining rigs that heat buildings or even hot tubs. What if the same could be done for governance models? What if one could harness and redirect the burn associated with government inefficiency?
While the cash burn from government inefficiency can be seen in all sorts of fields (i.e. legal costs), in its most pure form it is seen as bribery. By systematizing and legalizing bribery, a system can benefit from while minimizing its negative effects. This may sound novel, but is practiced by nearly every major democratic government in the form of lobbying.
Lobbying is just formalized bribery: Money spent to give those with wealth more power in the system. Instead of allowing energy—money, in this case—to be entirely burnt off from the system, it is paid above board, allowing it to be taxed. As an added benefit, some of the funds spent lobbying go to productive efforts, like drafting of legislation.
This is why outlawing or heavily restricting lobbying is generally a dumb idea. Wealthy families and companies want to influence politics. Wherever demand is high enough, wealth will find a way. Were lobbying to be instantly outlawed, the funds would simply shift to bribes.
Is there a way the system could more efficiently redirect this wasted energy?
Consider what would happen were we to remove the barriers present in current lobbying and political donations. Lobbying and donations are used to “buy access” to politicians. What if, instead, politicians had a set amount of time—say one day a week—put aside just to grant access to anyone willing to pay for it?
Hours during this time could be put up for auction, with 80% of the money spent being redirected to a government tax pool, 10% going to the politician’s reelection campaign, and 10% going to the politician’s political party. Donation restrictions would be totally removed for money spent in this way.
While it might seem unfair to political challengers that their incumbent competition would have a steady fundraising stream, in reality incumbent politicians are already spending huge proportions of their elected terms just trying to raise funds to win the next election. Perhaps a system like this would at least free up more time for politicians to actually serve their constituents.
Were we to outlaw political fundraising, it would just go underground. We would argue that paid office hours would ultimately reduce overall donation levels, as there would be more transparency around access (many groups at present donate more than they need to, not exactly knowing how much will move the needle). A similar line of logic applies to the 10% allocation to a politician’s political party. Were that amount not included, parties would still need ways to raise funds and ultimately do so using less efficient means.
This is not to say this system is above reproach. We suspect that it would quickly become a practice for companies to buy far more hours than they need from a politician to give the politician “time off.” While not the intent of the system, at least a significant portion of the funds would fund government programs through the 80% portion taxed.